Security Dictionary (Security)¶
A dictionary for looking up the key terms of 5GC security by meaning and usage. For the detailed flows, see the Authentication chapter / Security chapter.
Related: Authentication chapter / Security chapter / Identifier Dictionary / NF Dictionary
Authentication/key terms¶
| Term | Meaning | Actor/Location | Notes | Spec |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5G-AKA | The 5G version of the AKA authentication scheme | UE / AUSF / SEAF / UDM | In addition to HRES verification (RES is generated on the UE side), the SEAF receives KSEAF and also handles key derivation from KAMF onward | TS 33.501 §6.1.3.2 |
| EAP-AKA' | The AKA' authentication scheme on the EAP framework | UE / AUSF / UDM | EAP-based mutual authentication | TS 33.501 §6.1.3.1 / RFC 5448 |
| Authentication method selection | Choosing between 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA' | UDM/ARPF | The UDM/ARPF decides | TS 33.501 §6.1.2 |
| KSEAF | The top-level anchor key handed from AUSF to SEAF upon successful authentication | AUSF→SEAF | The top of the key hierarchy | TS 33.501 §6.2 |
| KAMF | The key derived from KSEAF | Held by the AMF | Below KSEAF | TS 33.501 §6.2 |
| KNASint / KNASenc | NAS integrity key / NAS ciphering key | AMF・UE | Derived from KAMF | TS 33.501 §6.2 |
| KgNB→KRRCint/KRRCenc/KUPint/KUPenc | The various keys used on the AS side | gNB・UE | Derives the AS keys starting from KgNB, which is derived from KAMF | TS 33.501 §6.2 |
| SUCI / SUPI / SIDF | The UDM's SIDF de-conceals the SUCI, which conceals the permanent identifier SUPI | UE (conceal) / SIDF within UDM (de-conceal) | For details see the Identifier Dictionary | TS 33.501 |
| ARPF | Storage of the long-term key and generation of authentication vectors | Within UDM | Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function | TS 33.501 |
Algorithm/procedure terms¶
| Term | Meaning | Actor/Location | Notes | Spec |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NEA (NEA0/1/2/3) | Ciphering algorithm | NAS layer・AS layer | Used for NAS/AS ciphering | TS 33.501 §5.11 |
| NIA (NIA0/1/2/3) | Integrity protection algorithm | NAS layer・AS layer | NIA0 is limited to unauthenticated emergency calls | TS 33.501 §5.11 |
| NAS SMC (Security Mode Command) | Security activation at the NAS layer | AMF⇔UE | Enables NAS ciphering and integrity protection | TS 33.501 §6.7.2 |
| AS SMC | Security activation at the AS (radio) layer | gNB⇔UE | Enables AS ciphering and integrity protection | TS 33.501 §6.7.4 |
| UP integrity protection (KUPint) | User-plane integrity protection | gNB・UE | Introduced in Rel-15, constraints relaxed in Rel-16 | TS 33.501 |
Keys descend by hierarchy
Upon successful authentication the top-level KSEAF is determined, and it is progressively derived down to KAMF → the various NAS/AS keys (TS 33.501 §6.2). The permanent identifier SUPI is concealed over the air as SUCI, and the UDM's SIDF de-conceals it. For the flow of the procedure see the Authentication chapter; for the details of keys and protection see the Security chapter.
Diagram: key hierarchy tree¶
This puts the derivation relationships from the table above into a single tree. Lower keys are derived from higher keys, and the lower a key sits the narrower the scope (segment) it protects. The key point is that KAMF branches into the keys for NAS (terminated at the AMF) and KgNB, the starting point for AS (terminated at the gNB).
flowchart TB
KSEAF["KSEAF
Top-level anchor key
(AUSF→SEAF on successful authentication)"]
KAMF["KAMF
(held by the AMF)"]
subgraph NAS["For NAS (terminated between UE ⇔ AMF)"]
direction LR
KNI["KNASint
NAS integrity"]
KNE["KNASenc
NAS encryption"]
end
KGNB["KgNB
Starting point for AS
(to the gNB)"]
subgraph AS["AS = for radio (terminated between UE ⇔ gNB)"]
direction LR
KRI["KRRCint
RRC integrity"]
KRE["KRRCenc
RRC encryption"]
KUI["KUPint
UP integrity"]
KUE["KUPenc
UP encryption"]
end
KSEAF --> KAMF
KAMF --> KNI
KAMF --> KNE
KAMF --> KGNB
KGNB --> KRI
KGNB --> KRE
KGNB --> KUI
KGNB --> KUE
classDef anchor fill:#fde,stroke:#c69,stroke-width:2px;
classDef nas fill:#eef,stroke:#66a;
classDef as fill:#efe,stroke:#3a3;
class KSEAF,KAMF anchor;
class KNI,KNE nas;
class KRI,KRE,KUI,KUE as;
How to read the diagram
From the top-level KSEAF (the anchor key handed from AUSF to SEAF upon successful authentication), KAMF is derived, and from there it splits into the NAS keys (KNASint / KNASenc) and KgNB, the starting point for AS. From KgNB, the various RRC and UP keys for the radio segment are further derived. NAS keys terminate at UE⇔AMF and AS keys at UE⇔gNB, and the lower a key sits the narrower the segment it protects. Thanks to this hierarchy, even if the key of one segment leaks, it is unlikely to propagate to higher keys or other segments. Note that derivations above KSEAF also exist (K →〔CK/IK〕→ KAUSF → KSEAF); for the full picture, see Security Advanced (level5).