Secondary Authentication — PDU Session Authentication by DN-AAA¶
Why — Network registration and DN authorization are separate¶
Primary Authentication handles access to the 5GC. Secondary Authentication allows the target DN to authenticate and authorize a PDU Session request. Successful primary authentication alone does not authorize connectivity to that DN (TS 33.501 Clause 11.1.1 / Clause 11.1.2).
This chapter uses a non-roaming, normal-service example in which the SMF determines that secondary authentication is required during PDU Session establishment. This authentication procedure is not performed for emergency PDU Sessions (TS 24.501 Clause 6.3.1.1).
What — EAP roles and transport¶
- UE: The EAP peer participating in DN authentication, using a DN-specific identity and credentials.
- SMF: The EAP Authenticator, handling EAP exchanges between the DN-AAA and UE.
- DN-AAA: The external DN's authentication and authorization server.
- AMF: Carries N1 SM information between the UE and SMF. It does not decide the outcome of DN EAP authentication.
- UPF: Transparently forwards communication between the SMF and DN-AAA in this example.
References: TS 33.501 Clause 11.1.1 / Clause 11.1.2; TS 23.502 Clause 4.3.2.3. The AAA protocol is implementation/configuration-dependent; this example selects RADIUS carrying EAP (RFC 2865 Clause 4.1–Clause 4.4, RFC 3579 Clause 2.1 / Clause 3.1–Clause 3.2).
Procedure — Secondary Authentication during Establishment¶
The UE is already registered with NAS security established and supplies a DN-specific identity in its request. The example does not reuse an earlier authentication/authorization result and uses the UPF path. Establishing an N4 Session for AAA traffic is distinct from completing a PDU Session for user data (TS 23.502 Clause 4.3.2.3; TS 33.501 Clause 11.1.2).
{ueContextId} and {smContextRef} identify contexts. HTTP responses illustrate successful variants (TS 29.502 Clause 5.2.2.2–Clause 5.2.2.3, TS 29.518 Clause 5.2.2.3.1).
The DN-specific identity is not necessarily an EAP-Response/Identity packet. Here RADIUS EAP-Start leads the DN-AAA to send an initial EAP-Request/Identity. The User-Name value and its relationship to the DN identity depend on implementation and configuration; RFC 3579 Clause 2.1 recommends including Calling-Station-Id in User-Name for EAP-Start. EAP packets are carried in EAP-Message attributes, with Message-Authenticator on applicable RADIUS packets (RFC 3579 Clause 3.1–Clause 3.2).
sequenceDiagram
participant UE
participant RAN as NG-RAN
participant AMF
participant SMF
participant UPF
participant AAA as DN-AAA
UE->>RAN: ULInformationTransfer<br/>(RRC#59; UL NAS Transport: DNN#59; payload: PDU Session Establishment Request / SM PDU DN Request Container)
RAN->>AMF: Uplink NAS Transport<br/>(NGAP#59; NAS-PDU: UL NAS Transport)
AMF->>SMF: Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext<br/>(HTTP POST /nsmf-pdusession/v1/sm-contexts)
SMF-->>AMF: 201 Created<br/>(HTTP#59; SM context)
Note over SMF: Select secondary authentication from subscription data and local policy
opt No N4 Session is available for AAA forwarding
SMF->>UPF: PFCP Session Establishment Request<br/>(PFCP#59; AAA forwarding path)
UPF-->>SMF: PFCP Session Establishment Response<br/>(PFCP)
end
SMF->>UPF: G-PDU<br/>(GTP-U#59; RADIUS Access-Request: User-Name, EAP-Message / EAP-Start)
UPF->>AAA: Access-Request<br/>(RADIUS#59; User-Name, EAP-Message / EAP-Start)
loop First Identity, then exchanges required by the EAP method
AAA->>UPF: Access-Challenge<br/>(RADIUS#59; EAP-Message: EAP-Request/Identity or method Request)
UPF->>SMF: G-PDU<br/>(GTP-U#59; RADIUS Access-Challenge / EAP-Request)
SMF->>AMF: Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer<br/>(HTTP POST /namf-comm/v1/ue-contexts/{ueContextId}/n1-n2-messages#59; Authentication Command / EAP-Request)
AMF-->>SMF: 200 OK<br/>(HTTP)
AMF->>RAN: Downlink NAS Transport<br/>(NGAP#59; NAS-PDU: DL NAS Transport / Authentication Command)
RAN->>UE: DLInformationTransfer<br/>(RRC#59; DL NAS Transport / PDU Session Authentication Command / EAP-Request/Identity or method Request)
UE->>RAN: ULInformationTransfer<br/>(RRC#59; UL NAS Transport / PDU Session Authentication Complete / EAP-Response/Identity or method Response)
RAN->>AMF: Uplink NAS Transport<br/>(NGAP#59; NAS-PDU: UL NAS Transport)
AMF->>SMF: Nsmf_PDUSession_UpdateSMContext<br/>(HTTP POST /nsmf-pdusession/v1/sm-contexts/{smContextRef}/modify#59; N1 SM)
SMF-->>AMF: 204 No Content<br/>(HTTP)
SMF->>UPF: G-PDU<br/>(GTP-U#59; RADIUS Access-Request / EAP-Response)
UPF->>AAA: Access-Request<br/>(RADIUS#59; EAP-Message: EAP-Response/Identity or method Response, State if present)
end
alt DN authentication and authorization succeed
AAA-->>UPF: Access-Accept<br/>(RADIUS#59; EAP-Success / authorization information)
UPF-->>SMF: G-PDU<br/>(GTP-U#59; RADIUS Access-Accept)
Note over SMF,UPF: Continue PDU Session establishment<br/>Further N4 / N2 configuration, etc. (outline)
SMF->>AMF: Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer<br/>(HTTP POST /namf-comm/v1/ue-contexts/{ueContextId}/n1-n2-messages#59; N1 Accept / EAP-Success, N2 SM)
AMF-->>SMF: 200 OK<br/>(HTTP)
AMF->>RAN: PDU Session Resource Setup Request<br/>(NGAP#59; NAS-PDU: DL NAS Transport / PDU Session Establishment Accept)
RAN->>UE: RRCReconfiguration<br/>(RRC#59; dedicatedNAS: DL NAS Transport / PDU Session Establishment Accept)
UE-->>RAN: RRCReconfigurationComplete<br/>(RRC)
RAN-->>AMF: PDU Session Resource Setup Response<br/>(NGAP)
Note over AMF,SMF: N2 result and subsequent N4 update continue in establishment
else DN authentication fails
AAA-->>UPF: Access-Reject<br/>(RADIUS#59; EAP-Failure)
UPF-->>SMF: G-PDU<br/>(GTP-U#59; RADIUS Access-Reject)
SMF->>AMF: Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer<br/>(HTTP POST /namf-comm/v1/ue-contexts/{ueContextId}/n1-n2-messages#59; N1 Reject / EAP-Failure)
AMF-->>SMF: 200 OK<br/>(HTTP)
AMF->>RAN: Downlink NAS Transport<br/>(NGAP#59; NAS-PDU: DL NAS Transport / PDU Session Establishment Reject)
RAN->>UE: DLInformationTransfer<br/>(RRC#59; DL NAS Transport / PDU Session Establishment Reject)
endStep-by-step explanation¶
- Decide whether secondary authentication is needed: The SMF checks subscription data and local policy. It is not performed for every DNN and PDU Session on every occasion.
- Supply the DN-specific identity: In this example, DNN is carried in the outer UL NAS Transport, while DN information is in the SM PDU DN Request Container within the inner PDU Session Establishment Request (TS 24.501 Clause 5.4.5.2.2; TS 33.501 Clause 11.1.2 step 4). If the request does not supply a DN-specific identity, an additional EAP Request/Identity and Response/Identity exchange is available (TS 33.501 Clause 11.1.2).
- Prepare the AAA communication path: If an existing N4 Session cannot be used, prepare the required path. The UPF does not independently decide the DN-AAA authentication result.
- Carry EAP over NAS SM: Following EAP-Start,
PDU Session Authentication Commandcarries the initial Request/Identity andPDU Session Authentication Completethe corresponding Response/Identity. Later method Requests and Responses use the same NAS messages. If Access-Challenge contains State, return it in the next Access-Request (RFC 2865 Clause 5.24). - Apply the result to establishment: During establishment, success is delivered in Establishment Accept and failure in Establishment Reject, including the EAP result.
Authentication Completereturns the current EAP response; it is not a declaration of authentication success (TS 24.501 Clause 6.3.1.1). - Check establishment through completion: EAP-Success alone does not prove that N2/N4 and radio-resource configuration are complete. See PDU Session Establishment for the remaining successful-path processing.
Direct SMF-to-DN-AAA access
When the DN-AAA is inside the 5GC and directly reachable, a procedure without the UPF is also specified. N4 Session establishment for AAA forwarding is then omitted. Do not make the illustrated UPF path a mandatory condition for every deployment (TS 23.502 Clause 4.3.2.3).
Result messages differ during and after establishment
This diagram covers establishment. For successful re-authentication after establishment, the result uses PDU Session Authentication Result; on failure, EAP-Failure is carried in PDU Session Release Command. Also distinguish these from primary authentication's Authentication Request/Response (TS 24.501 Clause 6.3.1.1).
Packet Analysis¶
- Follow the DNN and PDU Session ID, and correlate EAP Requests with Responses.
- Distinguish
PDU Session Authentication Completefrom the final EAP-Success/Failure. - The SMF starts T3590 when sending the Command and stops it upon the corresponding Complete. Retransmissions and abnormal cases follow TS 24.501 Clause 6.3.1.2; do not assume one universal duration.
- Capture/decryption availability for SBI and AAA traffic, and specific log formats, depend on the implementation and analysis environment.
Knowledge check¶
- Is the AMF the EAP Authenticator? → No. It is the SMF in this example.
- Is EAP-Success during establishment always delivered in Authentication Result? → No. During establishment it is included in PDU Session Establishment Accept.
3GPP Specification¶
- TS 23.502 V18.14.0 Clause 4.3.2.3
- TS 33.501 V18.8.0 Clause 11.1.1 / Clause 11.1.2
- TS 24.501 V18.14.0 Clause 5.4.5.2.2 / Clause 6.3.1.1 / Clause 6.3.1.2
- RFC 2865 Clause 4.1–Clause 4.4 / Clause 5.24: RADIUS packet types and the State attribute.
- RFC 3579 Clause 2.1 / Clause 3.1–Clause 3.2: RADIUS/EAP, EAP-Start, and EAP-Message / Message-Authenticator attributes.
Next Step¶
Primary Authentication / PDU Session Establishment / PDU Session Reject / Callflow